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The Time of Vigny
Reading a Poet: In and Out of Time
Vigny exists in many times at once. He apprehends time and the times 
through writing, which is in turn shaped by the pressures they exert and 
is its own kind of temporal medium. One time that becomes his is that of 
an af fective, ref lective and poetic response to the here and now – and to 
modernity, which amounts to saying that he writes within a temporality 
that is itself wholly lacking in fixity.1 The claim has been made with regard 
to Vigny that, in the time in which he writes, poetry came to be a discourse 
in which the impact of the loss of providential beliefs is acknowledged 
and through which the temporality of human transience, as it comes to 
be newly articulated, is explored.2 The issue which I shall examine here is 
the complexity of poetry as a temporal medium, one within which Vigny’s 
poems exist and which also extends beyond them, so much so that we are 
prompted to ask just how we are now to locate him in time.
The pivotal year of 1830 was a notable one for Vigny in several respects 
– he published one play and completed another, met and fell in love with 
Marie Dorval, witnessed the July Revolution and served for a time in the 
1 See Malcolm Bowie on the ways in which the Revolution presented challenges of 
historical interpretation for writers of Vigny’s generation, in Sarah Kay, Terence 
Cave and Malcolm Bowie, A Short History of French Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 221.
2 On crises of belief and their impact on nineteenth-century poetry, in particular that 
of Vigny, see Yves Bonnefoy, ‘L’enjeu occidental de la poésie’, in L’Identité littéraire de 
l’Europe, ed. by Marc Fumaroli et al. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000), 
p. 216; Bonnefoy’s essay has been translated by James Petterson as ‘At Stake: Poetry 
in the Western World’, Common Knowledge, 8 (2002).
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reconstituted Garde Nationale. It was also a year that mattered poeti-
cally. In 1830, he wrote a note for a projected poem with the title ‘Colère’ 
[‘Anger’]. Here, Vigny’s ‘je’ [‘I’] concedes that the existence of  God is open 
to doubt, hinting both at the emergence, under conditions of modernity, 
of a distinctively secular view of life and at the feeling of loss bordering 
on desolation that accompanies it: ‘Dieu, sais-je ce que vous êtes, et si 
vous existez?’ [‘God, do I know who you are, and whether you exist?’].3 
And indeed, both this outlook and the temporal break it seems to imply 
will come back into view more than once, first in ‘Paris’, which appeared 
soon after its composition in 1831, and later in ‘La maison du berger’ [‘The 
shepherd’s hut’], first published in 1844, collected only posthumously in 
Les Destinées [The Destinies].
Clearly what this fragment also indicates is that there is scope to link 
Vigny’s writing to wider movements in the thought and writing of his 
contemporaries, for whom the death of God was a pervasive concern.4 The 
problem is that of the loss of familiar meanings. The question it prompts 
is that of the attitude we can ascribe to Vigny in his attempts to grapple 
3 Alfred de Vigny, Œuvres complètes, I, Poésie – Théâtre, ed. by François Germain and 
André Jarry (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p. 320. Unless otherwise indicated, all further 
references to Vigny’s writings will be to this edition, henceforth abbreviated in the text 
as OC, I; references to ‘Paris’ (pp. 105–12) and to ‘La maison du berger’ (pp. 119–28) 
are by line number.
4 On the scope to distinguish between the death of God understood as the end of a 
Platonic belief in the suprasensory world and as a sign of the diminished authority 
of the doctrine of faith, see Martin Heidegger, who aligns Nietzsche and his notori-
ous proclamation with the former view, in ‘The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead”’ 
(‘Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”’ [1943]), in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 61–64; 
on the prehistory of Nietzsche’s statement in Hegel and others, see pp. 58–59. I com-
ment further on the significance of Vigny’s crisis, in Patrick O’Donovan, ‘Poetry and 
the Discourse of Happiness in Nineteenth-Century France: The Case of Vigny’, in Joie 
de vivre in French Literature and Culture: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeman, ed. 
by Susan Harrow and Timothy Unwin (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2009), 
arguing that his reappraisal of systems of belief extends as much to the discourse of 
progress, seen by Heidegger as one substitute for the dead God, as to religious senti-
ment; in that essay, I quote more fully from Vigny’s poetry than there is scope to do 
here.
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with it. The challenge of reading Vigny is poetic, in that precisely what is 
not clear is how we might read his work as poetry, given the philosophical 
orientation articulated in the fragment from 1830, given, after all, the very 
historicity of the angry stance which the title of this aborted ‘Élévation’ 
[‘Elevation’] seems to imply. For, if Vigny’s poetry does contain insights into 
an emergent secular and non-providential outlook, that dimension would 
seem only to reinforce its pastness. Even if his intimations of a world-view 
to which we are more or less attuned make some impression on us, the ways 
in which they find expression may seem to tread a fine line between the 
self-scrutiny of a self-questioning subjectivity and the merely portentous.
Each of these dif ficulties is compounded by that of register, in that 
the very language of Vigny’s poem may seem today to be at odds with its 
speculative substance. Malcolm Bowie applies self-consciously experimental 
approaches to Mallarmé’s verbal art with a view to af firming what matters 
in his poetry, namely its ‘tracing within the text of an irreversible human 
destiny’.5 The point is that Mallarmé’s engagement with open metaphysi-
cal questions is indissociable from the dif ficulties of his poetic practice. 
Although Bowie concludes that Mallarmé’s aesthetic is incommensurate 
with that of earlier poets of the same century, I hope that a way of reading 
can be found within which Vigny’s treatment of destiny, a term to which, 
after all, he gives special emphasis, can still be read alongside that of others, 
including Mallarmé.
Indeed Vigny’s poetry has been received as emblematic, in contexts 
which do impinge on the temporality of a poetry which we can call modern. 
For Yves Bonnefoy, he is, with Baudelaire, Nerval, Rimbaud, even Mal-
larmé, a ‘grand mort’ [‘one of the great dead’] – one of the begetters of a 
modernity which at the beginning of his career seemed to Bonnefoy to be 
in a sorry state.6 Here, it is with Mallarmé and others that he appears as a 
poet to whom we must appeal so as to understand something of the role 
of poetry in modernity. The temporal vicissitudes of modern poetry here 
precipitate a shift in the time to which we might choose to assign him.
5 Malcolm Bowie, Mallarmé and the Art of Being Dif ficult (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), p. 153.
6 Yves Bonnefoy, ‘Entretien avec François Lallier’, NU(e), 29 (March 2003), Relectures 
de Pierre Jean Jouve 1, pp. 18–19.
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For Bonnefoy, then, as for some other poets who are our contemporar-
ies in a way that Vigny is not, Vigny continues to make temporal claims on 
us. It is on this basis that he can be called upon to sustain the ef fort to think 
about and reaf firm the place of poetry today. With great force but at the 
same time very elliptically, René Char characterizes poetry here and now as 
a violent transformation of otherwise utilitarian discourse.7 Today, poetry 
is constantly under threat from ‘la mort du verbe’ [‘the death of the word’]. 
For Char, a poem comes into existence because a poet contrives to adopt 
an elusive stance with regard to the appropriations to which language has 
become inescapably subject in ‘notre monde de l’image’ [‘our world of the 
image’]. To illustrate the currency of such a stance and the poetic outcomes 
it yields, Char appeals to Vigny (as to Villon, Baudelaire and Mandelstam): 
what we witness, as he presents Vigny as saying in the closing stanza of ‘La 
maison du berger’, is an unexpected and dramatic shift in the face of what 
he ends simply by terming ‘la fin’ [‘the end’]. The poem’s ‘impérissables 
derniers vers’ [‘imperishable closing lines’], which Char quotes in full, 
amount to something that continues to be distinctively poetic. At the end 
of Vigny’s poem, time becomes secular. In other words, it becomes subject 
to a mortality which we know to be irreversible; but this time remains the 
indispensable medium of human capacity, such as it is. What Char identi-
fies as poetic, namely the condensation of the poet’s words, compounds 
the singular reversal which we witness in this stanza with regard to human 
time and the projects which it can be said to sustain.8
In the account Bonnefoy gives of his own practice, indeed, of his 
existence, as a poet, Vigny becomes the bearer of a temporal identity that 
is again decisive, though more indeterminate. Bonnefoy states that, in the 
poems he read as a child, what distinguished poetic from everyday language 
7 René Char, Sous ma casquette amarante: entretiens avec France Huser, in Œuvres 
complètes, ed. by Jean Roudaut (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 823.
8 On Char’s view of Vigny as the true originator of Romanticism in French poetry, see 
Bertrand Marchal, who sees in Char the perpetuation of an encyclopaedic conception 
of literature characteristic of Romanticism, in Bertrand Marchal, ‘Le romantisme de 
René Char’, in René Char en son siècle, ed. by Didier Alexandre et al. (Paris: Éditions 
Classiques Garnier, 2009), pp. 53–54, 60.
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were elements of prosody – alliteration, assonance, rhythms – which, while 
dif ferent from music, ‘conféraient pourtant à l’écoute une importance aussi 
spécifique que primordiale’ [‘conferred nonetheless on the act of listening 
an importance which was as specific as it was fundamental’].9 The experi-
ence of poetry cannot be equated with the act of reading the printed word, 
but rather with sound-events inherent in the words as they are heard and 
half-repeated. It was this, as a distinctive way of experiencing poetry, that 
drew Bonnefoy, as he tells us, to Racine, on the one hand, and to ‘La maison 
du berger’, on the other.
The appeal to Vigny proves to be a recurrent thread in Bonnefoy’s 
thinking about musicality in poetry. Bonnefoy explores what he sees as 
the equivalence between musical instruments and the ways in which word-
sounds sustain discourses of thought as much as of art: sound is the ‘réserve 
des occasions où à tout moment peut se déclarer le tout autre’ (Bonnefoy, 
L’Alliance, p. 52) [‘a reservoir for those occasions where what is wholly other 
might suddenly declare itself ’].10 This equivalence explains, he says, the 
af finity certain poets feel with certain instruments. But, in Vigny’s case, the 
temporality of this identification, while manifestly poetic, is nonetheless 
ambiguous: ‘ainsi du cor chez Vigny, qui dit dans un poème qui fut célèbre 
qu’il en écoute avec émotion la sonnerie triste errer au loin dans les bois’ 
[‘so it is with the horn in the case of Vigny, who, in a poem which was once 
famous, says that he listens with emotion to its sound ringing out sadly in 
the distant woods’]. It is almost as if Vigny’s poem has become as distant 
as the horn it evokes, as if the emotion which the poet experiences must 
somehow, if we are to recover its poetic significance, be translated into a 
discursive claim which is non- or extra-poetic. Thus Bonnefoy concludes 
for Vigny, in doing so, he transplants him into a new temporal space, the 
‘ici’ [‘here’] of an indeterminate ‘nous’ [‘us’]: ‘ce son du cor est pour lui 
un déchirement de la figure du monde, une invite à chercher là-bas, dans 
l’invisible, dans l’inconnu, la voie d’une évidence en notre ici impossible’ 
9 Yves Bonnefoy, L’Alliance de la poésie et de la musique (Paris: Galilée, 2007), p. 15.
10 Here, of course, Bonnefoy refers to Vigny’s ‘Le Cor’ [‘The Horn’]; see Roland-François 
Lack’s essay in this volume.
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[‘the sound of the horn is for him a gash in the face of the world, an invita-
tion to search over there, in what is invisible, unknown, the path towards 
some manifest and incontrovertible thing in our impossible here’].
For both these writers, in brief, Vigny’s time continues to be that of 
poetry, albeit in ways which have their own ambiguities, temporal and other. 
To justify his view of poetic language, Char invokes Vigny’s example: the 
experience of reading him recreates something that is ‘impérissable’ in a 
world where time and other forces – the insatiable demands on our atten-
tion of the universe of the visual, the devaluation of language – threaten 
the existence of poetry.11 At the same time, this ef fect is produced within 
a time which is that of a single poem, in that the impact of the seven lines 
quoted by Char derives from the very notable shift which they represent 
in the context of ‘La maison du berger’ as a whole, as the poet is prompted 
to re-evaluate the apparent withdrawal from the world which he seems to 
initiate at the outset. This is an outcome that is drastically compressed in 
Char’s transformation of the poem into something that it is not, namely 
a brief text. For Bonnefoy also, Vigny, among other poets, belongs to that 
past which precedes the beginnings of his existence as a poet, the moment 
at which, in other words, he was able to ‘me porter au-delà des vers sans 
véritable nécessité qui s’étaient succédé sous ma plume depuis l’enfance’ 
[‘go beyond the verses lacking a true necessity which had emerged from 
my pen since childhood’].12 With that of Hugo, and then in turn Racine 
and Chénier, as Bonnefoy came to read them, Vigny’s poetry testifies to a 
virtuality of words, the virtuality of a ‘parole’ [‘utterance’] which is (again) 
‘tout autre’ [‘wholly other’] and which nurtures a desire for poetry that he 
was ultimately to assume fully for himself. But then Vigny, among these 
other poets, becomes at least residually suspended in the virtual state with 
which the emergent poet has broken. Even gestures that make a virtue of 
identification are subject to their own imperatives. What remains to be 
seen is just how we can align the times of poems and of projects which 
11 Char’s characterization recalls, of course, ‘La maison du berger’ itself, where poetry 
is described as the ‘impérissable amour’ (line 196) [‘imperishable love’] of ‘vrais 
penseurs’ [‘true thinkers’].
12 Yves Bonnefoy, Traité du pianiste et autres écrits anciens (Paris: Mercure de France, 
2008), pp. 78–79.
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have their dif ferences. I shall return to this as a question for our times at 
the end of this essay and shall now turn to a direct discussion of some of 
Vigny’s writing.
A Poetry of the Present
Vigny’s own concern with time – with moments, conjunctures, with the 
links and the disjunctions between discrete temporalities – goes some way 
to accounting for the kinds of questions which his writing poses and for 
the mobility which proves to characterize it. The fragment entitled ‘Colère’ 
gestures towards a process of self-questioning amounting to an existential 
crisis. A poem begun in the same year, entitled ‘Paris: élévation’ [‘Paris: 
an elevation’], maps several of the other dimensions of such a crisis, which 
extend to issues of ideology and belief, and ultimately to a whole world-
view. Here, as elsewhere in Vigny’s poetry, one ef fect of the loss of familiar 
meanings is that his work becomes permeable to a wide range of other dis-
courses. The poem’s engagement in the present of modernity is connoted by 
its references to a number of contemporary political ideologies and, more 
pointedly, its caustic portrayal of Benjamin Constant. Constant died on 
8 December 1830. His funeral, which took place on 12 December, was the 
largest public gathering seen in Paris since the July Days of the same year. 
In April 1831, Vigny published ‘Paris’ in a plaquette of twenty-eight pages. 
Ostensibly written on 16 January 1831,13 it contains the following lines:
‘Liberté!’ crie un autre, et soudain la tristesse
Comme un taureau le tue aux pieds de sa Déesse,
Parce qu’ayant en vain quarante ans combattu,
Il ne peut rien construire où tout est abattu. (‘Paris’, lines 115–18)
13 Contrary to the date given by Vigny, the poem was composed between the autumn 
of 1830 and the spring of the following year. I discuss brief ly the poem’s treatment 
of political ideology, in Patrick O’Donovan, ‘The Death of a Liberal: Four Lines on 
Constant by Vigny’, French Studies Bulletin, 100 (2006).
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[‘Freedom!’, cries another, and suddenly sadness
Like a bull kills him at the feet of his goddess
Because having fought for forty years in vain
He can build nothing where everything is in ruins.]
The demoralized apologist for a freedom of and for the moderns is none 
other than Constant, his identity being confirmed by Vigny in a footnote. 
The death of Constant and, no doubt, the July Revolution, are the occasion 
for a restatement of the conditions of modern life. As the poem progresses, 
however, it seems to be just the opposite: to be a disabused retreat from 
the contemplation of the world of which Constant and others claim to 
give an authoritative account. But the gesture of retreat itself amounts to 
a novel kind of engagement.14
In this poem, what seems at first momentous about the modern world is 
that it exceeds even an apocalyptic perspective. At the opening of the poem, 
the poet and a figure to whom he refers as the Voyageur [Traveller] climb a 
tower from which they survey a world in motion. In this oneiric space, the 
Voyageur can make out what the poet confirms to be a vast wheel – in other 
words, Paris. The city is then presented as an axis through which the rest 
of the world is put into motion. The Voyageur can also make out a furnace, 
whose f lames bring forth what is clearly an altogether new world, though 
the eventual outcome of this process remains disturbingly uncertain.
The emphasis in the poem’s closing lines is irreducibly secular: in Paris, 
as in every other city in the world, people are exposed to suf fering and 
death. While the prophetic strain may indeed be misplaced – once God is 
dead, things can hardly get worse – the poet is compelled, for precisely the 
same reason, to acknowledge that any redemptive perspective is open to 
doubt. The crisis, which is at once intellectual, spiritual, political, extends 
into an open present. When it comes, then, to ‘[les] choses de la vie’ [‘the 
realm of life’], the poet can only say: ‘Je ne sais’ (line 251) [‘I do not know’]. 
All that may come of this world is ashes and dust, but crucially we do not 
know this. What the Voyageur, in his turn, will be able to say for certain as 
he goes about his travels is that ‘Pour longtemps le monde est dans la nuit’ 
14 See André Jarry, for whom Vigny’s stance is a rejection of engagement, in André Jarry, 
Alfred de Vigny: étapes et sens du geste littéraire (Geneva: Droz, 1998), p. 313.
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(line 258) [‘For a long time the world will be in darkness’]. This is a veiled 
prophecy: what the speaker holds is that the conditions of the present bring 
us to the brink of an imponderable future.15 In an essay on ‘La maison du 
berger’, near the end of some comments on the music of sounds and colours 
in Western culture and, especially, Western poetry, Bonnefoy translates 
this statement of Vigny’s into one which is no less daunting: ‘L’univers 
est dans la nuit’ [‘The universe is in darkness’].16 He appropriates Vigny’s 
closing line as a conclusion of his own, though in the process converts the 
predicate into a gnomic present, seemingly independent of any here and 
now. Vigny’s present does find itself, once again, absorbed into the future, 
but is in the process abstracted from the now of the subject.
As for Vigny’s own stance vis-à-vis the modern, it is equivocal for 
specifically poetic reasons: where it leads ultimately to the cultivation of a 
prophetic outlook, the poetic engagement with politics, with ‘[les] choses 
de la vie’, is potentially harmful. Alongside the poem’s almost overblown 
symbols there is a ref lexive dimension which borders on the momentous 
– something apocalyptic, but just possibly something bordering on the 
vacuous.17 Ultimately, it is the exclusion of the prophetic outlook that gives 
rise to a paradox which is, for Vigny and indeed for his readers, distinctively 
poetic: the refusal to prognosticate simply projects the questions the poem 
asks into a present, that of today, where we may indeed feel that they remain 
unanswered. Perhaps ultimately, Vigny anticipates this present as much as 
he can be said to describe it, instilling in us a mode of anticipation through 
which we in turn can approach his future and indeed our own.18
15 On the currency of the present as an enunciation of the future when modified by a 
future time adverbial, see Suzanne Fleischman, The Future in Thought and Language: 
Diachronic Evidence from Romance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
pp. 17, 93.
16 Yves Bonnefoy, ‘Vigny, le peintre’, in Vigny: romantisme et vérité, ed. by Jérôme Thélot 
(Mont-de-Marsan: Éditions Interuniversitaires, 1997), p. 52.
17 In Bowie’s account, Mallarmé brings something like this ambiguity to bear on thought, 
in that ‘the more scrupulous […] thought becomes the thinner the partition which 
separates it from total vacuity’ (Bowie, Mallarmé, p. 18).
18 In this, he could be said to bear comparison with Kierkegaard considered as an antici-
patory thinker; for just such an approach, see Ronald Grimsley, Søren Kierkegaard 
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‘La maison du berger’: The Present of the Poem?
We have already seen that for his commentators today the time of Vigny 
could simply be said to be that of ‘La maison du berger’. Its preeminence 
can be linked to the uses to which Vigny himself puts the poem. It first 
appeared in the Revue des deux mondes in July 1844 – one of a sequence 
of five poems published by Vigny in support of his repeated ef forts in the 
course of the 1840s to win election to the Académie française. Though 
it appeared last in this sequence, it came, in the course of the protracted 
elaboration of the collection as a whole, to occupy a quasi-independent 
position as the opening piece in his projected collection of ‘poèmes philos-
ophiques’ [‘philosophical poems’], eventually to be published posthumously 
in 1864 as Les Destinées, but with the poem ‘Les destinées’ inserted before 
it as the opening text.
At the time in which the poem was completed and published, Vigny 
was no less concerned with the duality of time: the transience of the time 
of the subject is greatly intensified by the finality of an unredeemable death, 
the suprasensory domain being transformed into a limitless void. Vigny 
also brings these two temporalities into contact in a further gnomic frag-
ment, under the title ‘Poème’, where he writes: ‘Nous vivons dans la mort’ 
(OC, I, p. 336) [‘we live within death’].19
‘La maison du berger’ contains a series of vivid illustrations of the ways 
in which the temporal stakes of modernity have been misrecognized – the 
emergence of railways, to cite a notorious instance, results in a new relation 
to time, one which Vigny first castigates and then reappraises, in that he 
comes to see it as a symbol of a kind of harmonious globalization. Even so, 
and French Literature: Eight Comparative Studies (Cardif f: University of Wales 
Press, 1966), pp. 130 –58.
19 The fragment is dated October 1844. See Jarry, who links Vigny’s alliance of art and 
philosophy to Heidegger’s being-towards-death, in André Jarry, ‘Vigny philosophe’, 
Cahiers de l’Association internationale des études françaises, 45 (1993), pp. 193–94; he 
comments also on the dissociation of the divine from religion in Vigny’s imagina-
tion (p. 183).
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the poet’s preference is ultimately for a relation to the world shaped by the 
quite dif ferent temporality of reverie. But poetry has been no less af fected 
by modern times: in the second of the poem’s three parts, its progres-
sive immersion in the af fairs of ‘la cité’ [‘the city’], of the practical world, 
are said to have devalued it. From many angles, then, the poet appears to 
denounce what he terms the servile city and all it stands for. This claim 
to truth, when it comes to capturing the state of the times, is, of course, 
liable to be challenged. Alain Badiou repudiates Heidegger’s stance vis-à-
vis the ‘nihilism’ of modernity, denouncing its empty pathos and in the 
process identifying Vigny as the begetter of a ‘nostalgie réactionnaire’ [‘a 
reactionary nostalgia’] in the face of the supposed ascendancy of technol-
ogy in today’s world (ours as well as Vigny’s).20 Badiou then characterizes 
the enigma of the present in terms which somewhat echo Heidegger’s: it 
remains poised between the disabused exploration, typically in poetry, of 
the residual appeal of the sacred, on the one hand, and a pervasive version 
of this anti-technical and archaizing search for the ‘pseudo-liens’ (Badiou, 
p. 38) [‘pseudo-connections’] of ersatz religions, on the other. But what he 
claims nonetheless is that we have witnessed not the end but rather simply 
a suspension of philosophy, an outcome that can be remedied by breaking 
with the attitude ascribed here to Vigny. On this reading, Vigny is, at a 
stroke, disavowed philosophically, as well as poetically.
The poem, which is presented as a ‘Lettre’ [‘Letter’] addressed to an 
absent Éva, is one in which the future plays a prominent role: it is the tense 
in which the poet rehearses for her something of the life that awaits her 
beyond the city. The future, then, is that of a desired project which will be 
fulfilled, it would appear, only if the identification with Éva which is inti-
mated in the opening stanzas comes to be realized. This vision is presented 
as an alternative to the time of modernity, subject as it is to demands of the 
commercial state of society. But what gradually emerges as the poem’s true 
focus is a series of painful experiences which shape the poet’s understanding 
20 Alain Badiou, Manifeste pour la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1989), p. 33; here Badiou 
quotes Vigny’s famous characterization of the train as a ‘taureau de fer’ [‘bull of 
iron’].
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of the time of the subject. For in the finality of death the subject is con-
fronted with a temporality it cannot control, yet which determines much 
of the scope and meaning of human agency. This sentiment comes to be 
stated in words which the poet ascribes to Nature: ‘“Aimez ce que jamais 
on ne verra deux fois”’ (line 308) [‘Love what can never be seen twice’]. 
The future in which the poem’s closing stanza is expressed gestures towards 
the fragility of a present marked by both the experience and the prospect 
of death:
Nous marcherons ainsi, ne laissant que notre ombre
Sur cette terre ingrate où les morts ont passé (lines 330–31)
[So we will walk, leaving only our shadow
On this ungrateful earth where the dead have passed]
It signals an acceptance of the limits of human time, but also the realization 
that its transience is the sign of its distinctively human potential: it exists 
as such precisely by virtue of its co-occurrence with the past, which is the 
time of death. Here, the thinking which the poem incorporates takes the 
‘nous’ [‘us’] into a future that is expressed literally, in a future tense form, 
and that belongs only to us.
If Bonnefoy claims that ‘la poésie, c’est le refus de la mélancolie, un refus 
sans cesse oublié mais sans cesse réaf firmé’ [‘poetry is a refusal of melancholy, 
a refusal which is constantly forgotten but constantly reaf firmed’],21 it is 
perhaps because this attitude is anticipated in ‘La maison du berger’, in its 
oscillation between a present laden with anxiety and a future devoted to 
muted ref lection in the shadows. If we believe this to be a possible ef fect of 
poetry, then there are grounds for contesting Badiou’s characterization of 
Vigny, irrespective of the stance he takes vis-à-vis Heidegger. Among the 
many ref lections by Bonnefoy on nineteenth-century poetry, there is one 
intervention on Vigny to which I have already brief ly referred, a piece writ-
ten, tellingly, as a commemorative essay in 1997, entitled ‘Vigny, le peintre’ 
[‘Vigny, the painter’]. Published seemingly as the direct transcription of 
21 Yves Bonnefoy, L’Imaginaire métaphysique (Paris: Seuil, 2006), p. 66.
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an earlier paper which opens with the words ‘Mesdames, messieurs, mes 
amis’ [‘Ladies, gentlemen, friends’], Bonnefoy’s essay originates in a shared 
reading as the space of a double identificatory movement of its own – with 
the poem and with its readers. This gesture initiates its own temporal proc-
ess within the lecture-essay: in drawing on elements of Vigny’s poem, it 
brings us to the verge of a response where we can, after all, identify Vigny 
with modern poetry seen as a tradition extending into our own present. 
Bonnefoy alludes to the musicality of the poem’s closing stanzas; but then, 
in a move which is significant precisely because it amounts to a temporal 
shift prompted by this complex poem, he claims that this musicality is in 
fact to be understood as a form of painting. For Bonnefoy, this painterly 
dimension matters because it amounts to a space of and for thought (see 
‘Vigny, le peintre’, pp. 45–47).
Bonnefoy ends by reaf firming the claims of the ‘poème’, both ‘La 
maison du berger’ as a poem in its own right and the genre of the philo-
sophical poem which Vigny seeks to bring into being. He explicitly espouses 
the poem’s orientation to the future, arguing that Vigny’s ‘peinture d’hier’ 
[‘painting of yesterday’] can be brought into contact with a ‘réf lexion sur 
demain, sur le demain de l’esprit’ [‘ref lection on tomorrow, on the tomor-
row of the mind’]. But this movement also draws him towards modern 
poetry understood as a historical phenomenon, towards meditations just 
like these on the claims that can be made for poetry as a form of discourse, 
and away from individual poems. The poem and the time it occupies are 
somehow ef faced. Because of the thoughts it contains and because of its 
writing, Vigny’s poem is, Bonnefoy says, a source of value: it is ‘une valeur 
pour le temps présent’ (p. 67) [‘a value for the present time’], but if this is 
so, it is with regard to poetry and to the problems which confront it now, 
in the present in which Bonnefoy writes. As a result, the time of the poem 
as it becomes subsumed into the discourse of poetry (becoming, as Bon-
nefoy declares, its mirror), becomes indeterminate.
I mentioned earlier that, for Bowie, Mallarmé’s distinctiveness as a 
dif ficult poet aligns him with his Modernist successors, separating him 
decisively from Romantic writers like Vigny. On this point, Bonnefoy’s 
reception of Vigny seems to diverge from Bowie’s, in that he appeals to 
some tangible continuity with him. Bowie, by constrast, identifies him 
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with other poets who operate within a paradigm which ultimately cannot 
equip us to engage with forms of Modernist writing that are concerned 
with conceptual and existential crisis. For Bonnefoy, by contrast, a vital 
link to Vigny creates possibilities for poetry today, but even then such a 
connection is secured only by means of an unmistakable break with the 
poem’s own temporality.22
What do I conclude from this seeming impasse? Mallarmé can be 
said to be like Vigny in that he assumes the full transformation of the 
temporality of poetry as it converges with the thought of the death of 
God. In a famous letter, he says as much, intimating something of how 
he understands human destiny to be an issue for poetry. Poetry tells us, 
he seems to say, that what has value in life is indissociable from the vastly 
extended temporality of death, as it confronts the subject and as it exerts 
its transformative inf luence on the suprasensory realm, which as a result 
he is prompted to re-evaluate.23 It is the same stance as Vigny’s, though 
expressed more trenchantly and more exuberantly.
At the same time, with Vigny, we will always wonder whether there 
are any anxious latecomers24 – in other words, whether there are poets, or 
readers of poetry, for whom he is ultimately a figure who must be over-
come. Bonnefoy’s invocation of Vigny’s loyal readers will spontaneously 
seem to many to be something of a fiction, or a veiled concession to the 
happy few – and also a tacit admission that, when one reads Vigny, one is 
likely to do so within a more prolonged immersion in French poetry that 
22 For a sober assessment of the shifts in its conceptualization which may make it 
dif ficult fully to identify today with Vigny’s practice of a poetry that claims to be 
philosophical, see Dominique Combe, ‘Le poème philosophique ou “l’hérésie de 
l’enseignement”’, Études françaises, 41.3 (2005).
23 See his letter to Henri Cazalis of 28 April 1866, where he redefines the task of poetry 
as to reinvent something of the sublimity of the realm of the imaginary divine, 
even though it amounts to a ‘Rien’ [‘Nothing’], to nothing more than a glorious 
lie: Stéphane Mallarmé, Correspondance complète: 1862–1871, suivi de Lettres sur la 
poésie: 1872–1898, ed. by Bertrand Marchal (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), pp. 297–98.
24 For Harold Bloom, ‘priority in divination is crucial for every strong poet, lest he 
dwindle merely into a latecomer’, in Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Inf luence: A 
Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 8.
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will take us ‘beyond’ him. Even if we feel compelled to return to Vigny, 
the movement away from him may never be fully reversed, in that we now 
read him (and others) dif ferently in the light of what we have subsequently 
read, in the light even of the responses which he provokes and through 
which he is somehow superseded. On this reading, what is distinctive 
about the encounter between Vigny and Bonnefoy, or between Vigny 
and Char, is indeed the movement of identification – with what the later 
poet’s invitation to subsume the poem into the present conveys by way of 
intimations of poetic possibilities. This is a gesture that does not exclude 
its own Bloomean swerve in some new poetic direction. For the poet who 
precedes, who foretells, but does not tell, the death of God, whose poems 
remain as open as Vigny’s do both to the f lux of known history and the 
imponderability of what is to come, can perhaps have only an afterlife, can 
exercise only a fitful inf luence, strangely exempt from the anxiety which 
impels ‘strong’ poets to af firm themselves. But he illustrates no less power-
fully the paradox of the poet who is not a ‘strong’ poet: so as to read him at 
all, we must surrender to the text in ways which its very remoteness makes 
supremely unpredictable.
